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ABSTRACT
Western philosophy’s frequent conflation and denigration of ani-
mals, human others, embodiment and emotions has been powerfully 
documented over the past many decades. I explore the impact of this 
fear and loathing of the body, a somatophobia that infects much of 
the Western philosophical canon and its orientation toward people 
of color, white women, and animals. As I share reflections that are 
meant to enact and reveal an embodied pragmatism, I consider the 
potential of our love for dogs to ground a more embodied philosophi-
cal approach to love. Rooted in my own journey (as philosopher and 
dog lover), I pose questions about the significance of love and dogs 
both to the academy, and to flesh and blood theorists. How might our 
love for dogs support a more attentive, embodied engagement with 
both the world and the world of ideas? 
Catherine Bailey
31
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 23, Issue 1
“I have seen Ben place his nose meticulously into the 
shallow dampness of a deer’s hoofprint and shut his 
eyes as if listening. But it is a smell he is listening to. 
The wild, high music of smell that we know so little 
about” (Mary Oliver 2013, 111).
“So, then, one has no hope of understanding the nature 
of knowledge, reality, goodness, love, or beauty unless 
one recognizes the distinction between soul and body; 
and one has no hope of attaining any of these unless 
one works hard on freeing the soul from the lazy, vul-
gar, beguiling body. A philosopher is someone who is 
committed to doing just that” (Elizabeth V. Spelman 
1982, 113).
As he pondered tolerance and pluralism, American pragma-
tist William James made an audacious interspecies compari-
son:
“Take our dogs and ourselves, connected as we are by 
a tie more intimate than most ties in this world; and 
yet, outside of that tie of friendly fondness, how insen-
sible, each of us, to all that makes life significant for 
the other!—we to the rapture of bones under hedges, 
or smells of trees and lamp-posts, they to the delights 
of literature and art” (1899, 76).
I too exercise my empathetic imagination as I walk with my 
dogs. The cool sidewalk under my four toughened paws, the 
breeze lifting my hound’s ears, my twitching nostrils filling 
with the perfume of wormy earth, crocus shoots, rabbit dung. 
Like James, I am a philosopher who pays attention to dogs.  Or 
is it more accurate to say that I used to be a philosopher, before 
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I fell in love with dogs?  Certainly, the way I speak of dogs il-
lustrates the sort of marginal (non-) philosopher I have become. 
It has taken me nearly twenty years to abandon the ethereal 
realms of Plato and Descartes and begin to relax into pragma-
tism’s full-bodied embrace.  It is surely no accident that I ad-
opted William James and Olive—a plucky mutt whose Bassett 
chassis is splotched with Springer Spaniel—at about the same 
time. The dog’s world is the antithesis of the philosophical 
heights first revealed to me in college. That was an airy fanta-
syland, full of exotic birds, soaring overhead to discern general 
principles and diluted universality. By contrast, the pragma-
tist’s wet nose caresses the ground, pokes into the particulari-
ties, keeping the priorities of stomach and hearth ever in view.
To become a philosopher who loves dogs, and so takes them 
seriously, is to invite the dissolution of taken for granted di-
chotomies of knowledge, sense and cognition. It is to accept 
the violation of boundary between the physical and concep-
tual. Here, truth and falsity are not opposites so much as dif-
ferent flavors.  A dog sees with her nose and reads with her 
tongue.  She claims no objective distance, no knowing that is 
not internal, no thinking that is not already psycho-physical. 
She ingests with every sense organ and maps that information 
into her body. The dog is a scavenger not only of what might 
be eaten, but also of every facet of experience that could be 
coaxed of just a little more juice. The quest for truth is trans-
formed into a commitment to the fullness of reality.
Truth, after all, is not the point. This vibrant journey of 
sweat and sapidity reflects the integrity of experience in and of 
itself. Whether it is to be marked as true or false, or justified or 
unjustified, is as beside the point as the puny sign marking the 
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source of the Niagara Falls. In this doggy, pragmatist iteration, 
humans do not serve truth, bow to it, or kiss its ring. Rather, 
truth is our plaything, our tool, to be filled like a cook pot, or 
trusted like a well-worn hammer. Truth is a red balloon we fol-
low with our gaze as it slips out of view. It is a lead pipe that 
can serve as crow bar, window prop or baseball bat.  There is 
no knowing what it is in advance, or in essentialist or absolutist 
terms, but this no longer matters to us, for we have moved into 
the shadows beyond the Enlightenment. As one pragmatist puts 
it, following Rorty, “We should no longer rely on and believe in 
foundations, we should no longer worship anything, . . . and we 
should finally realize that our self, our language, and our com-
munity are governed by contingency” (Schulenberg 2007, 7). 
My own journey away from enlightenment-steeped, analyt-
ically-tinged academic philosophy has been a glorious devolu-
tion into dogness, a game of wrestling with dualisms: mind 
and body, thinking and feeling, high and low culture. It’s been 
a trajectory marked by fumblings with lofty theory and sticky 
immersions in the ignoble swamps of pop psychology. I watch 
brittle concepts crash to earth and harvest them as firewood as 
I renovate my life into a classroom where I permit myself to 
indulge my fascination for the dog eating the philosophy book 
as well as the contents of the book itself. The dog ate my home-
work? Indeed. And for the pragmatist, it is no wonder we resort 
to ingestion analogies when we are at our most philosophical. 
We want to chew on it a while. Drink it in. And after that, it is 
sometimes still hard to swallow. What does it say of us that our 
language both hides and proclaims the passionately embodied 
nature of such epistemological urges?
The simultaneous disguising and disclosure of the bodily 
maps neatly onto a similarly paradoxical orientation toward 
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non-human animals, whom we both adore and despise. And, 
by extension, the ambivalence about the body is not just coin-
cidental with vacillations about love as a worthy subject, but 
adheres to it. We cannot quite decide if love is a highfalutin 
spiritual hovering in the clouds or a sweaty, heaving bodily 
one. Because love straddles those boundaries so teeteringly, it 
defies many academic and intellectual categories, those gaping 
boxes prepared to swallow only what will be neatly contained. 
This ambivalence is noticeable even in some of the contempo-
rary philosophies that have bravely faced the bogeyman, as has 
Alan Soble in The Philosophy of Sex and Love. As I describe 
below, despite his eclectic approach, he handles love mostly at 
arm’s length; the better to add “logical rigor to the discussion 
of love” (Soble 1998, ixx), though he also labors to reach over 
philosophy to touch the bodies waiting on the other side.   
In a perverse way, bodily as they are, animals sometimes 
do represent love for humans, including how we may learn to 
enact the story of love. The child clings to her stuffed toy bear 
as someone she loves, but it is a love of consumption. She can 
stroke or destroy this animal proxy as she wishes, control it, 
dress it up, or fling it into the bushes. Is it so different from lap 
dogs, or even from how we discursively frame wild animals, 
bending them to our concepts, categories and narratives; for 
example, appropriating the lion for his majestic individualism? 
Does our overwriting of such beings reflect our frustration and 
failure at connecting to, controlling and escaping our own ani-
mal embodiment? How do our beliefs about animal love, about 
how we love them and how they love each other and us, give 
shape to our thoughts about human love?
And when it comes to experiencing animals’ feelings, is it all 
just projection anyway? Are our accounts of animal and human 
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love merely nested narratives based on presumption, layers of 
projection functioning like funhouse mirrors but grounded in 
very little? As one unabashed dog lover reflects:
“When a dog is rolling in fresh-cut grass, the pleasure 
on her face is unmistakable. No one could be wrong in 
saying that what she is feeling is akin to what any of us 
(though less often, perhaps) may feel. The words used 
to describe the emotion may be wrong, our vocabu-
lary imprecise, the analogy imperfect, but there is also 
some deep similarity that escapes nobody” (Masson 
1997, 1). 
But when dogs behave differently from humans—recall 
their frenzied greeting, apparently out of proportion to our mere 
jaunt to the store—don’t we dismiss it as a kind of stupidity? 
“In other words, when dogs do not behave as we do, we assume 
it to be irrational behavior” (Masson 1997, 2). Is it coincidental 
that this is the same dismissal that women’s “inscrutable” emo-
tional reactions have received for centuries? Aren’t the stupid 
emotions of dogs, women and people of color, including their 
supposed blind love for the men who abuse them, part of what 
proves their irrationality and, so, unfitness for philosophy?
Our relationship to animal love is confused, then, as convo-
luted as our on and off romance with our own fleshy selves, and 
it is a gendered and raced confusion. There is perhaps no story 
about somatophobia in Western thought that can’t be traced to 
the triptych enshrinement of maleness, whiteness, and human-
ness. To put it negatively, the discussion of dogs and love is 
simultaneously, always and already, a discussion of sexism, 
racism, and anthropocentrism. It is an association that helps 
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explain the urgency of engaging with the question of animal 
love, especially for women. As Anna G. Jónasdóttir urges:
“Concerning love as one of the most vital, and diffi-
cult – not the least for women, matters to deal with in 
practical life and in theory, it should be particularly ur-
gent for feminists to be (pro)active in this area and not 
only re-active to problems and solutions formulated by 
male/mainstream theorists” (2013, 25). 
The somatophobia that defines women’s experience and 
their placement in intellectual history, and that of people of 
color, is coextensive with the roles they have been assigned in 
sex and love. Is it any wonder that some of us long for escape 
from these devastating stereotypes?
My first gesture towards philosophy was almost certainly a 
yearning away from suffering, an urge to step back, observe, 
categorize and control. I wanted to survey the world from 
someplace safe, an aerie from which ambiguity and complex-
ity would be transformed into mere problems to be resolved.  I 
had understood Aristotle’s definition of the human as rational 
animal to mean that we were no longer merely contingently 
animal, that we were, at most, barely animal. Read this way, 
it’s an escape act of the first order, a sleight of mind that allows 
one to believe that she is no longer a mere beast among beasts, 
or a thing among things. What I can see by way of my magical 
rationality must be object, other than me, even if the other is a 
body, especially if it is my body. 
People of color and white women—never permitted full 
participation in this elevated pretense of elect subjectivity—
have been compared to animals of various sorts and regarded 
as somehow more embodied, more mired in immanence, than 
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white men. Recent racist speculations and judgments about 
Serena Williams—for example, comments about her evident 
physical power—are to the point. Such judgments reflect the 
relentless somatophobic associations that white supremacist, 
Eurocentric culture has drawn for centuries. Against this back-
drop, Brittney Cooper explains William’s inspirational, em-
bodied significance:
“That kind of body confidence from a dark-skinned, 
‘thick’ Black woman, with a round posterior that all 
my homegirls and I, straight and gay alike, admire, 
is hard won. This world does not love Black girls or 
women, and it takes every opportunity to project its 
own ugliness onto our bodies” (2015).
Sometimes the stereotypes are quite specific. For example, 
calling a woman a dog means she’s not just an animal, but ugly, 
common, and uninteresting, a creature whose value is properly 
calculated only relative to man’s purpose and pleasure. All such 
denigrations—directed at those others who are stupid, smelly, 
bestial, and instinctual—elevate the man of reason by contrast 
and serve as a foil to construct the only love that ultimately 
matters. This is philosophical love—philosophia—the love of 
the idea of love, rather than love itself—or even the love of 
love itself—which can be both physically and psychologically 
messy. Such pure love is universal, abstract, and pure. It is also 
white, male, and human.
But of course I am exaggerating, painting with far too wide 
a brush as I indulge my cranky musings. Capable philosophers, 
including feminist ones, have resuscitated the likes of Plato, 
Descartes, and Kant, delivering them from wholesale critiques 
that oversimplify their approaches to emotions and embodi-
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ment. It is a caricature to present them as mechanistic ratio-
nalists stomping out every flower of feeling on their quest for 
enlightenment. So, for example, Denis Kambouchner compli-
cates the reading of Descartes, reminding us that he ultimately 
depicts “love as a chief and prime element of affective life” 
and that “love is found in a notable spot: right after wonder, 
and before hatred, desire, joy and sadness” (2007, 24). Simi-
larly, Susan James has successfully labored to add nuance to 
our appreciation of philosophers who had been crudely treated 
by feminists and other critics in the recent past (2000).
Still, one must acknowledge that the rehabilitation of such 
champions of dualism goes only so far, for the rationalistic, 
paradigmatically philosophical handling of love is indeed a 
conceptual one; even among those who took it quite seriously, 
as did the “first philosopher of love,” Plato. So, if we are in-
clined to scold those second-wave feminists for being too hard 
on the philosophical superheroes, it is healthy to keep in mind 
that “philosophers are indeed in love with ideas, ideas (how 
and wherever we may wish to locate their origins) [they] are 
what draws one to philosophy, are what philosophers engage 
with, are what philosophers teach to students and debate with 
each other, and are what philosophers allow themselves to be 
consumed by” (Cristaudo 2012, 19).
Whatever abstract functions and roles have been assigned to 
emotions and embodiment in these philosophers’ ontological 
and epistemological economies, far too often prejudices about 
others have served as the scrim against which to bring their 
facsimiles of feeling to life. Still on the subject of Plato, for 
example, Spelman reminds us that in Theaeteus:
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“The implication is clear: if any old opinion were to 
count as real knowledge, then we’d have to say that 
women, children, and maybe even animals have knowl-
edge. But surely they don’t have knowledge! And why 
not? For one thing, because they don’t recognize the 
difference between the material, changing world of ap-
pearance, and the invisible, eternal world of Reality” 
(Spelman 1982, 116).
None of which is to say that there haven’t been male think-
ers on the borders all along, punching at the bricks of the tow-
ering, logocentric edifice, some less misogynistic than others. 
And certainly, writers and thinkers in other disciplines—phi-
losophers in exile, very often—have also been exploring topics 
regarded as alternative or abject in their messy particularity. 
All along there have been theoretical sideshows to philosophy’s 
main stage. But even subjects that feel edgy, abject or subal-
tern can ultimately serve to help justify the preeminence of the 
main course.
The general cultural focus on sex, for example, which, hap-
pily, has helped to open space for exploring sex in scholarly cir-
cles, may simultaneously mark love as even more taboo and out 
of reach. As a bodily expression, sex is situated squarely on the 
outskirts of the intellectually acceptable. But its designation as 
the dark underbelly only makes it more appealing, precisely 
because of its abject, forbidden character. It evokes prurient 
curiosity more than respect. And this very rendition of sex as 
subaltern, through the contrast it provides, helps to firm up the 
more rarified conceptions of, say, heterosexual, marital love.
The ambivalent and connected valuations of sex and love 
are reflected even in thoughtfully philosophical contemporary 
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accounts of sex and love such as Soble’s. That he assiduously 
assigns sex and love to two separate parts of the book is to the 
point. That sex is sometimes treated in starkly gritty terms—
his first remarks about oral sex are not for the faint of heart—is 
also to the point (1998, xxxi). The heady, self-conscious analy-
sis surrounding most of his discussion of both sex and love 
makes such animalistic moments stand out as voyeuristic or 
even pornographic. It is as if the distance Soble-the-philoso-
pher keeps from the body makes his forays into the nasty side 
of sex more titillating. It comes as no surprise that Soble uses 
the subject of sex, and feminist philosopher Alison Jaggar, as 
his example as he schools his readers in the rigors of his disci-
pline. As Soble primly notes: 
“Analytic philosophy is, when done well, known for 
its clarity, precision, and carefulness. Sometimes it is 
not done altogether as it should be. It will be helpful, in 
becoming acquainted with the methods of conceptual 
philosophy of sex, to examine an example of a well-
meaning attempt at analysis that goes astray – commit-
ting the mortal sin of equivocation” (1998, 5). 
Jaggar doesn’t just get it wrong in Soble’s eyes; her argu-
ment about sex is such a howler that it’s fit to serve as a caution-
ary tale about the proper practice of the analytic method. The 
sexually/philosophically ignorant feminist serves to highlight 
Soble’s frank and skillful handling of this earthy, complex, ta-
boo subject. 
Perhaps this feminist philosopher can so naturally serve as 
a foil to Soble’s razor sharp conceptual parsing because the 
norms of Western white masculinity encourage boys to learn to 
love wisdom by turning away from sex, women, and even their 
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own emotions. It isn’t, of course, as if their feelings are thought 
to disappear, but that they are pushed into a handy closet down 
the hall. One learns to corral the horses of one’s passion. For 
the rational animal, feelings like love are spun into meta-feel-
ings, as Plato’s Symposium is about the idea of love rather than 
love itself. By the time the philosopher has subjected love to 
analysis, love will no longer be the phenomenon that might 
have seduced his interest in the first place. 
Do our academic disciplines too cut us into pieces along the 
same lines as the dualistic philosophers we now caricature? 
Are we further cleaved into mind/body, professional/personal, 
rational/emotional by our dedication to the facades we believe 
we must maintain to continue to be tolerated in our traditional 
fields? Certainly, I did not always thrive in the in-between. 
I once reveled in the attention of my philosophy professors, 
bearded white men with the power to confirm my intelligence 
and exceptionality.  They helped me believe that I was, or could 
be, so much more than a mere animal/woman.  They loved me, 
in a way, and I loved being associated with them, so far from 
insipidity and vulnerability, the rickety swing set of my moth-
er’s life.  Our mothers’ lives.
For to abandon the sharp edges of philosophy is to some 
degree to choose a woman’s life, a womanly life, whether one 
is, in fact, a woman or man.  Her life imbued with, steeped 
in, percolated from, the mundane even as it props up the cel-
ebrated, the arcane, the profound.  As Adrienne Rich wrote: “I 
have a very clear, keen memory of myself the day after I was 
married: I was sweeping a floor . . . This is an age-old action, 
this is what women have always done” (1986, 25). To be a woman 
is to be there, amidst the detritus and droppings of everyday 
life; it is to feel oneself most oneself among the preconditions 
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and leftovers of embodiment, the dirty dishes, the laundry, the 
shitty diapers, the garden soil. 
To fully acknowledge, let alone to embrace, this bodily side 
of life is to renounce one’s claim to the philosophical lineage as 
it has been defined. There is no way around it, though one may 
try to make compromises. I have gotten by as a sort-of, half-
assed philosopher who writes about animals, or, in another 
oblique gesture of avoidance, a philosopher who writes about 
philosophers who write about animals. It is liberating to feel 
almost done with that. And to have the renunciation arise not 
from principle —it is not as if I am against philosophy — but 
from lack of desire, as the dog abandons the bone, eventually, 
from apathy or exhaustion, or because a squirrel has darted 
across the yard.  Could the promise of truth or tenure or saint-
hood really be more compelling than a chatty squirrel just out 
of reach? And would I want to leave my dogs there, rejected, 
longing for me outside these campus walls?
I do not know if it is right to call it love, what I feel for my 
dogs, but then I do not know if it is right to denote as love what 
I feel for my partner or my sister or my dead mother. This in-
timate distance we have with dogs is an evocative enigma. As 
Masson writes:
“The closeness between dogs and people is taken for 
granted and, at the same time, seen as something im-
mensely mysterious. Naturally I feel close to my dogs, 
but who are these dogs? . . . Just who are these beings 
lying here, so close to me, and yet also so remote? They 
are easily grasped, and they are unfathomable” (Mas-
son, 1997).
Catherine Bailey
43
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 23, Issue 1
It feels like love and it feels radical. To love a dog, or anyone, 
not just as an object or property, or as a cherished plaything, 
but as a being, to love the beingness of this other. 
As Masson writes of his dog: 
“There were just the two of us sitting in the living 
room, and it was very quiet. I looked over at Sasha and 
noticed that she was looking at me. Suddenly I was 
overwhelmed with the thought: There is another being 
in this room, another consciousness. There is some-
body here besides me” (1997). 
And don’t we all share creaturely being with these animals, 
though it may feel important for us to pretend otherwise? So 
much conspires to persuade us of how unlike we are, but true 
dog love calls it into question, threatening this order of things. 
Nib, the 18-pounder, meditates with me each morning, her 
dense weight pinning me to the earth, her ragged breath met-
ronymic, as present as my own silent ins and outs. From the 
rooted body we form, we rise together as spirit, like smoke, to 
the heavens, our morning breath lifting us toward enlighten-
ment until the needs for tea and kibble shatter the illusion.
Is it presumptuous to draw this tenuous connection between 
my dog and enlightenment? What if I mean to refer not to the 
white-hot blast enlightenment of the phoenix, but the subdued, 
grunting, gradual awakening of the aging mutt? 
Perhaps it’s enough to say, then, that I am giving up knowing 
as a philosopher in favor of knowing as a creature among crea-
tures. But am I seeking knowledge in my daily humbling as I 
watch their tails rise like semaphores in the breeze, their brows 
furrow at the puzzle of scent or sound? Do I glean philosophi-
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cal insights? “A dog can never tell you what she knows from 
the smells of the world, but you know, watching her, that you 
know almost nothing,” writes Oliver (2013, 27). We can refer to 
this poet’s curiosity as epistemological—does it sound better 
that way?—but can this be accurate if one’s ultimate goal is im-
pressionistically disclosive rather than discursively delineated? 
It, whatever it is, does not seem to respond to our arbitrary 
names in any case. 
I confess that I learned to speak of ethics without ever men-
tioning compassion or love except as a contrast to reason. And 
that was me reciting Kant’s categorical imperative to slack-
jawed freshman who were lost as it is only possible to be in a 
Minnesota winter. They came for nourishment and, aspiring 
philosopher that I was, I gave them arguments. Would my stu-
dents have been better or worse off if I had served them pizza 
and beer instead of this brand of ethics? For what if the philo-
sophical enterprise isn’t simply produced by a mind vaguely 
linked to a body but is itself a flowering of, or maybe an excre-
tion of, our particular embodiment? Is this the direction James 
points to when he says that the philosopher recognizes ratio-
nality “as he recognizes everything else, by certain subjective 
marks with which it affects him.... The transition from a state 
of puzzle and perplexity to rational comprehension is full of 
lively relief and pleasure” (1879, 317). It is an intellectual long-
ing and satisfaction all right, but it is rooted in the body.
Is a being generally predisposed to satisfaction, say, a prop-
erly adored dog, unfit for knowledge seeking as the philosopher 
conceives of it? Surely the caricature of the scientist or philoso-
pher includes a restless quality that we are supposed to admire. 
He is driven to seek, must know, will not be satisfied until he 
learns the truth. The philosopher-hero is fundamentally itchy. 
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And so, when Mill says it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied 
than a happy pig, we, like the pig, must dumbly concur (1861, 
260). 
For pigs or dogs the hunger is for food or stroking, or play or 
rest, an asking that can be answered. For the philosopher, we 
are meant to understand, there is an interiority, the fundamen-
tal character of which is a healthy desire, a robust sense of lack. 
The philosopher wrestles and wrests. He sculpts, fleshes out, 
unpacks, elucidates, deduces.  He is relentless in his analytic 
quest. His mental activities are the manly, heroic adventures of 
Lewis and Clark, or George Washington. Not only is the phi-
losopher never satisfied, he is righteously proud of never being 
satisfied, the devil’s advocate who never tires. After all, doesn’t 
intellectual complacency suggest that one is either stupid or not 
paying attention?
And so the dog emerges guilelessly from a primordial soup 
of creaturely plenitude, wearing an easy satisfaction with the 
here and now, hungry only for the comforts and challenges of 
play and love and food and shaft of sunlight. No wonder wom-
en are regarded as dogs, given that women have been thought 
to share the dog’s intellectual passivity, unless they—I mean 
we, of course—are conniving, cat-like, to manipulate men. The 
male mind seeks out, pokes and prods—recall Bacon’s raping 
scientist—while the woman or Black man (or entire continent 
of Africa) is regarded as lolling, passive. Satisfied, is a reproach 
leveled at one who settles vapid and cow-like, accepting chain-
link limits on the mind and spirit. 
The restless raptor’s radar picks out the rabbit against the 
dappled backdrop of sun, air current and shadow while the dog 
blithely shares the rodent’s mammal plane. For the dog, there 
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is no climbing out of this furry stratum to survey the situation, 
no deus ex machina to transport the dog from its grounded 
obscurity. But is the view from the mountaintop truer than the 
one from the ground? Is it more beautiful? From which point 
of view do such judgments become meaningful? What fuller 
truth could there be than what is here in this wet-fur-slobber, 
pricking-whisker proximity?  Higher truth? Higher than what? 
They may assess me from such altitudes and imagine they 
measure me entirely, but from there they cannot even catch my 
scent. 
I rebel against this cartoon philosophy I have drawn, but in 
my floundering I sometimes latch onto this word pragmatist, 
though it is still a name for philosophers of a sort, still a seri-
ous title. Why? Is it to reassure myself that I could still count 
amid the world of white men and their ideas? Musing animal 
that I am, drawn inexorably into this web of wondering, what if 
I refuse philosophy altogether or it refuses me? Am I even ca-
pable of leaving it behind?  What should I call myself as I gorge 
on esoteric language I know will leave me bloated and regret-
ful? I say that I theorize now as a shameless lover of dogs, but 
isn’t that just another denial and pretense? And why is it never 
enough to simply state that I am a woman, impelled by desire 
and lassitude and a curiosity that does not, as it turns out, begin 
and end with either my nose or my intellect?
What can love studies mean in this battered, beleaguered 
context? Is it merely the culmination of outsider scholars from 
across the spectrum who could find no respect or traction for 
their impulses toward love in their first disciplinary families? 
Is love studies, then, another queer academic movement in its 
insistence that what is closest to our hearts no longer be fur-
thest from our dissertations? As Ferguson reminds us, “ . . . 
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there has been a huge gap between, on the one hand, how most 
people think (or ‘what people know’) about love, that it is one 
of the most valuable ‘things’ in human life, and on the other 
hand, the rejection, ridiculing, or at best marginalization of 
love as a topic for serious studies in much of academia” (2013, 
1). Can it be that this is not an accident? That precisely how one 
announces oneself as a serious academic—code for philoso-
pher since many of us are, after all, doctors of philosophy—is 
through the renunciation of love, especially the crass love of 
mere animals and other bodies?
Of course, love hasn’t been entirely neglected in the acad-
emy. But it is rare that love has been treated attentively, lov-
ingly, in a way that respects the integrity of what it is, as what 
it is. As Jónasdóttir explains, love has rarely been considered 
as a force in its own right, but rather as an epiphenomenon of 
other, more fundamental, aspects of reality. For example, it has 
been explored as “merely a sublimated sexual energy (libido)” 
or “an ideological phenomenon of the cultural superstructure 
(helping maintain the bourgeois hegemony)” (2013, 19, empha-
sis in original). Love has received attention, but on the way 
to something else, on a journey to some other more serious, 
respectable concern.
Is it an accident that James turned to the dog to reflect and 
describe his pragmatist musings? He understood that some-
thing fundamental was reflected in this form of close attention 
to these nearby, elusive creatures. James always loved dogs and 
because of love he could properly see them. And perhaps partly 
because, as a privileged white man, he was not overly driven 
to prove himself as a philosopher—he is known as the father 
of psychology after all, and born as much from literature and 
medicine as from philosophy—; he could indulge such senti-
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mental concerns. Certainly, James took seriously the notion of 
sympathy and his exercises of loving attention to dogs are also 
(at least) attempts to occupy their point of view. It’s not so dif-
ferently from how a poet may listen to dogs: “The dog would 
remind us of the pleasures of the body with its graceful physi-
cality, and the acuity and rapture of the senses, and the beauty 
of forest and ocean and rain and our own breath. There is not a 
dog that romps and runs but we learn from him” (Oliver 2013, 
118-1119).
That we can learn from our encounters with dogs in ways 
that are dramatic and trivial is surely indisputable. In this vein, 
we have milked them for scientific purposes; in heinous acts of 
objectification we have even nailed them to boards and dissect-
ed them live to satisfy curiosities both passing and profound. 
From them we can learn about the limitations of our under-
standings of what it is to know, to be, and to feel. That dogs 
are useful to us is not in question. But what would it be like to 
inhabit a richer conception of dog love that does not reduce the 
dog to mere prop for human realization and catharsis? To enter 
into relational exchange with the dog in a way that goes beyond 
exploitation and appropriation? 
To love dogs in the language of a poet or outsider scholar 
can be almost as silly as to be a dog at her most flounderingly 
foolish. And yet we cannot resist these gullible, often goofy 
creatures, be we philosophers, neonatal nurses or backhoe 
operators. We invite dogs into our worlds and fall into theirs, 
engaging in an unequal dance that teeters on the edge of the 
perverse. As Masson sees it, “To a certain extent, we are the 
jailers of dogs, since any freedom they achieve must be ac-
quired by wheedling it out of us. This is one good reason they 
learn to read us so well. Survival dictates that dogs learn about 
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us and learn to play us to some extent” (1997). It is a queer kind 
of love indeed, as revelatory of our shames and hungers as of 
our aspirations and ambitions. What else could it be given the 
position we have assigned to ourselves between the angels and 
beasts? We float up up only to discover that we ache for the rub-
bing of earthly embodiment. We lampoon the dog, belittle him, 
abuse him, only to find that we long for his rude, wet-nosed 
attentions. We carry pictures of our dogs into faculty meetings, 
physics conferences, and high courts, but mostly they remain 
hidden in our smartphones, together with our menstrual calen-
dars and grocery lists.
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